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MULTIMEDIA: THE CONVERGENCE OF NEW




In October 1993, the Bell Atlantic Corporation and Tele-Communica-
tions Inc. proposed the largest merger in history for media companies.1
The now abandoned $33 billion deal2 is the latest in a series of announce-
ments of mergers and working partnerships as entertainment, communi-
cations, computer software, and computer equipment manufacturing
companies attempt to position themselves to best exploit the emerging
multimedia technologies.3
Multimedia has become a catch-phrase which refers to an ever-widen-
ing range of developing technologies promising "interactive" home en-
tertainment, virtual reality, and the delivery of fully manipulative sound,
images, and text into the computers of the average consumer. 4 Nineteen
ninety-three saw a "gold rush" of sorts in the burgeoning multimedia in-
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1985. Mr. Sprague would like to thank
Bobbie McMorrow and the associates of McMorrow Associates for their kind efforts in ar-
ranging interviews with various legal experts in the emerging fields of multimedia law.
1. John Markoff, A Phone-Cable Vehicle for the Data Superhighway, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1993, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Lawrence M. Fisher, Computer and Phone Link Is Studied by Intel and MCI, N.Y. TiMES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at C4.
The Intel Corporation and the MCI Communications Corporation said... that
they had agreed to explore and develop ways to integrate the personal computer
and the telephone.
The first product to emerge from the agreement ... will be an add-on circuit
board for personal computers that will allow users to simultaneously transmit data,
audio and video over telephone lines. Such a device would facilitate video confer-
encing, and allow co-workers across the globe to collaborate on projects.
Analysts said Intel was well positioned to broaden its dominance of the per-
sonal computer market to include telephones as the computer, communications
and media industries converged.
"It's the hottest game in town, the market opportunity every semiconductor
maker is chasing," said Richard Whittington, an analyst with Gruntal & Company.
"This will be the boom business for the next 10 years, and Intel will be a major
player."
Id. See also infra note 11.
4. L.R. Shannon, On Getting Started in Multimedia, N.Y. TrMsS, Sept. 21, 1993, at B6.
,The "Computer Dictionary" (Microsoft Press) defines "multimedia" as: "The combination of
sounds, graphics, animation, and video. In the world of computers, multimedia is a subset of
hypermedia, which combines the elements of multimedia with hypertext, which links the
information." Less formally, "Jargon" (Peachpit Press) defines "multimedia," in part, thus:
"The buzzword of the 90's." Id. See infra Part I and accompanying text for more detailed
discussions of specific multimedia-related products and services.
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dustry, despite the fact that most participants have no idea what the indus-
try will fully entail or how it will be received by the public. 5 "Every
company in the entertainment and communications business is going to
be under pressure to form partnerships... "6 This cacophony of technol-
ogies, industries and strategic alliances raises a substantial number of legal
issues.
7
This Article focuses on Copyright Act issues as they relate to the
emerging industry commonly known as multimedia. Part I discusses the
basic elements of multimedia in order to provide an understanding of its
constituent parts. Most multimedia products and services are either a
technological extension or derivative of computer software. Part II sets
forth how copyright law provides protection for computer software and its
5. Peter H. Lewis, The Next Tidal Wave? Some Call It 'Social Computing,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1993, § 3, at 8.
Perhaps without knowing exactly what it will all mean, everyone seems to be
talking about the impending convergence of computer networks, groupware, tele-
phone services, handheld electronic devices, cable television, the Internet and
other on-line information services, mixed in with the entertainment industry, tradi-
tional news media and other communications technologies.
"A technological shock wave is about to strike society and the workplace," Mr.
[William M.] Bluestein[, a senior analyst with Forrester Research Inc.] said. "In the
last six months, computer hardware manufacturers, software providers, cable TV
operators, and phone companies have been caught up in a frenzied mating dance."
Id. Peter H. Lewis, What Evil Lurks in the Chips Of Men? The Shadow Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1993, § 3, at 8.
For the first time, there will be people from broadcasting and telecommunica-
tions. This has everything to do with the convergence of computing, communica-
tion and entertainment. Everyone in all three industries is trying to be uniquely
positioned to take the money of the people in the other two industries. I wonder,
though, once the PC guys learn that Joe Eszterhas gets $3 million for a 135-page
screenplay, whether some of them will want to switch from writing software to
dialogue.
Id. (Interview with Robert X. Cringely, nom-de-poison-plume for the back-page gossip colum-
nist of Infoworld, a computer industry weekly newspaper, discussing the recent Agenda 94
conference, which attracted 450 of the biggest names in the personal computer industry);
William M. Bulkeley &John R. Wilke, Can the Exalted Vision Become Reality? Early Attempts Show
Buyers May Be Leery, WALL ST. J., Oct 14, 1993, at BI.
[I]n a few early experiments, consumers did not enthusiastically embrace the idea
[of interactive systems]. In the early 1980s Knight-Ridder Inc. lost millions on an
interactive video-text experiment in Florida that let people request and read news
on their TV screens. J.C. Penney & Co. spent $106 million on Telaction, an interac-
tive shopping system, before shutting it down in 1989. Sears Roebuck & Co. and
International Business Machines Corp. have spent an estimated $800 million on
their jointly owned, and unprofitable, Prodigy Services Corp., in part because they
overestimated the desire of computer users to shop on-line.
"The technology is all there," says Nancy Bushkin, a spokeswoman for Viacom
Inc., which is building a test interactive cable system in Castro Valley, California.
"What's missing is the consumer and exactly what the consumer wants and what
they'll pay for."
Id. Prodigy Services, the IBM-Sears joint venture, is redesigning its service and is "seeking
opportunities to offer the Prodigy lineup of information and games, stock trading, home
shopping and electronic mail directly to the television sets of cable customers." Glenn Rifkin,
At Age 9, Prodigy On-Line Reboots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at DI.
6. Richard Turner, Bell-TCI Deal Puts Hollywood in the Spotlight WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
1993, at BI.
7. For an excellent overview of the various multimedia-related intellectual property is-
sues, see William A. Tanenbaum & William K. Wells,Jr., Multimedia Works Require Broad Protec-
tion, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at Sll.
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relevance to multimedia applications. The scope of copyright protection
available to computer software is not precisely defined, however, and con-
tinues to evolve in reaction to the ever-changing role of software in our
society. Part II.A. reviews the current scope of copyright protection avail-
able to computer software. Part II.B. discusses specific copyright issues
related to multimedia. The various analyses and controversies in software
copyright protection should prove insightful and will most likely serve as a
precursor to the issues confronting copyright protection for multimedia
applications.
I. MULTIMEDIA APPLICATIONS
Multimedia may best be viewed as a convergence of technologies
from which a vast number of specific products and services will emerge.
8
In general, multimedia refers to a variety of information media-text,
sound, images (both still and motion)-delivered in digital form. 9 The
key element of multimedia is that the recipient no longer passively re-
ceives the information but actually "interacts" with it. The recipient can
control the manner in which the information is delivered, change the or-
der and method in which it is presented, and alter the final product.
While this description of multimedia may be vague, that is partially
due to the fact that all the resultant products and services have yet to be
designed or even conceived. 10 The common thread throughout these
multimedia products and services is their interactive capability. The ability
of individuals to interact with the delivered information makes the emerg-
ing products and services unique.
One element of multimedia which has received a great deal of atten-
tion is the creation of an "information superhighway" incorporated in "a
single powerful box on top of each home television set that would com-
bine the diverse streams of information that now flow separately into the
home: telephone calls, television shows, video rentals, newspapers and
even books."1" The convergence of cable operators and telephone com-
8. Steve Lohr, For Computer Convention, Be Sure to Pack Vision, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993,
§ 1, at 37.
"[D]igital convergence," . . . means the expected technological melding of com-
puters, telecommunications, television and publishing.
Convergence is a big conceptual ball of string that wraps in 500 television chan-
nels and the information superhighway, hand-held personal digital assistants and
massively parallel supercomputers, computers that talk back and intelligent software
"agents" programmed to act as a person's alter ego. It is the ultimate high-tech
vision - and a $3.5 trillion business, by one estimate - beckoning on the horizon.
Id.
9. Information (data), whether it is text, images or sounds, is converted to an electrical
impulse represented by either a one or a zero. For example, music is initially composed of
analog sound waves which can be converted into digital code by breaking the waves into
small bits that are represented by a number. See A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair
Play, 105 HARv. L. REv. 726, 726-27 n.2 (1992). Computers manipulate (process) informa-
tion in digital form. For example, computer programs are ultimately converted into a series
of ones and zeros for use by the computer. See generally infra note 76.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. Markoff, supra note 1, at Al. In the information superhighway, "this set-top device
will be the steering wheel, combining the video controls of a cable converter box, the two-way
1994]
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panies exploits the resources of each industry, allowing not only the deliv-
ery of information to consumers, but also providing the channels through
which consumers can communicate (interact) with the service providers as
well as other consumers. 12 At present, the interactive products which ap-
pear closest to being market-ready are systems focusing on electronic pro-
gram guides to help viewers navigate the maze of channels available on
cable systems.13 These systems are designed to offer to viewers informa-
tion, commercial opportunities, and games.
14
capabilities of a telephone and the information-processing power of a personal computer."
I.
12. See id.
Currently, cable networks have the capacity to carry hundreds of channels of
television programs or other information, but most cable systems are not very good
at letting consumers send information back over the network, whether to order a
movie or play video games with other cable customers.
Telephone "channels," by contrast, can handle only limited amounts of infor-
mation, but they have an almost magical ability through switching systems to let
anyone on the network communicate with anyone else.
Therein lies the promise of this [the Bell Atlantic Corporation and Tele-Com-
munications Inc.] mega-merger, which will blend the information cargo-carrying ca-
pacity of the nation's largest cable company and the traffic-control talents of one of
America's most technically sophisticated telephone companies.
Id. The now-abandoned Bell Atlantic/Tele-Communications merger is not the only alliance
between telephone and cable companies. Time Warner Inc., the second-largest cable televi-
sion company in the country, has teamed up with U.S. West; The Nynex Corporation is team-
ing with Viacom Inc. in its bid for Paramount Communications; and Southwestern Bell has
recently purchased two cable systems outside Washington. Edmund L. Andrews, A Marriage
of Media, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at D10. There are a number of examples of computer,
cable and communications companies forming alliances. Silicon Graphics has agreed to pro-
vide Time Warner Inc., a cable, media and entertainment concern, with technologies for
cable-TV boxes. See Don Clark & Stephen K. Yoder, Computer Industry Sees A Feast of New
Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A7. Hewlett-Packard Co. will develop technologies to
let interactive-TV subscribers use color printers. Id. International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM) is developing products for everything from the wiring for the back of TV sets and
chips for set-top boxes to mainframe computers that work as "servers," storing data and play-
ing traffic cop in huge interactive networks (IBM and Ameritech Corp., a Midwest regional
Bell company, are testing out mainframes as servers in the Chicago area). Id. IBM is also in
trials with Bell Atlantic using smaller computers to serve up full-motion videos. Id. Intel
Corp., the big semiconductor maker, is working with Microsoft and General Instrument
Corp. to make sophisticated set-top boxes for interactive TV; as is 3DO Co., a startup com-
pany that just began selling a new interactive entertainment system that plays software on
compact disks. Id. "These companies' plans require networks that can carry more data,
along with sophisticated switching systems to move interactive video information around.
Today's cable systems, for the most part, are one-way networks without that switching capabil-
ity. Phone companies are good at switching but need cable companies' higher data capac-
ity." Id.
13. See Software Patent Hearings, CONSUMER ELECRONICS, Feb. 7, 1994, § 6.
14. See Anthony Ramirez, Challenge Within a Single Wire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993, at Cl
(graphics). In a hypothetical example of how the combined technologies of telephone and
cable companies may provide services, a football fan in Chicago can watch a televised game
with a friend located in Los Angeles. Id. In addition, the Chicago fan could supplement the
viewing with past highlights from a video archive and team statistics from a remote data base.
See id.
Software publishers are eagerly anticipating the arrival of interactive television as a
means of delivering computer programs to customers who will be able to permanently ac-
quire the software or merely temporarily use it for a reduced fee. The software publishers
believe interactive television will lead to a greater number of software titles, available to more
persons, at reduced costs. "[M] any software companies are looking at ways to use interactive
television to get their titles into more homes .... " Tim Deady, Software Companies Gearing Up
To Travel On 'Superhighway, L. A. Bus. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 1.
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Virtual reality, another form of multimedia product, is an interactive
experience which presents a synthetically generated environment to the
user through visual, auditory, and other stimuli.' 5 Although motion pic-
tures also attempt to place the user in synthetically generated environ-
ments, the two major differences between virtual reality and traditional
motion pictures are that virtual reality technology can create a much
stronger illusion and that it is an interactive, not passive, experience.
16
Virtual reality experimentations and applications include: allowing doc-
tors and medical students to practice surgery on three dimensional "pa-
tients"; 17 remote operation of robots by NASA;18 remote operations by
surgeons; 19 allowing architects and engineers to "walk" through a building
before it is built;20 flight simulation 2 ' and aircraft design; 22 arcade
games;23 and to generally allow individuals to "journey" to places they
would otherwise not be able to go.
24
Combined interactive movies and video games are an additional
emerging multimedia product. These video games are actually movies
with multiple plot lines and endings. Players interact with the characters
in the movies/games and determine the course of events by their (the
players') actions.
25
15. Randy Pausch, Three Views of Virtual Reality: An Overview, COMPUTER, Feb. 1993, at 79.
16. Id. Virtual reality completely immerses the user in the synthetic environment by
mounting small displays inside a headset placed on the user's head. Id. Because the display
is computer generated, different views are created for each eye, providing a true stereo dis-
play that gives depth information. Id. In addition, both the user's head position and orienta-
tion are tracked, resulting in the views changing in relation to the movement of the user. See
id. The result is that users perceive themselves as being inside the scene, with a three-dimen-
sional understanding of objects' location with respect to the user's own body. See id. Users
can also interact with virtual objects contained within the three-dimensional space by wearing
instrumented gloves-reaching out and manipulating objects. See id. When combined with
directional audio, the illusion of interacting with "real" objects is quite strong. See id.
17. John Holusha, Carving Out Real-Life Uses for Virtual Reality, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 31, 1993,
§ 3, at 11. It is predicted that patient-specific diagnostic data will be entered into a computer
which will allow the doctor to "operate" in virtual reality to determine the best approach to
an operation for that patient. See id.
18. See Pausch, supra note 15, at 79.
19. See Holusha, supra note 17, at 11. The Army is developing a system using virtual
reality to link doctors behind battle lines with mobile operating rooms near the front lines.
Id.
20. See Pausch, supra note 15, at 79; see also Andrew H. Rosen, Virtual Reality: Copyrightable
Subject Matter and the Scope ofJudicidal Protection, 33JuoimETiucsJ. 35, 37 n.5 (1992) (explaining
how researchers converted an architect's plans to a 3-D model before actually building, to
show future occupants how the building would look and feel).
21. See Michael Moshel, Virtual Environments in the US Military, COMPUTER, Feb. 1993, at
81.
22. See Holusha, supra note 17, at 11.
23. See Richard Brandt, et al., It's Blasting Beyond Games and Racing to Build a High-Tech
Entertainment Empire, Bus. Wt., Feb. 21, 1994, at 66.
24. SeeJohn Tierney, Jung in Motion, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1993, at C1.
25. John Tierney, Movies That Push Buttons, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 3, 1993, § 2, at 1. Examples
of interactive movie/video games include: "Mortal Kombat," a graphics image-based kick-
and-punch game; "Aladdin," based upon the Disney Company movie, which combines graph-
ics and hand-drawn animated characters; and "Voyeur," a game which shows real motion
pictures on the screen while players control which of hundreds of twists and turns the plot
will take. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Amazing Video Game Boom, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 66.
19941
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Multimedia also encompasses the intermingling of text, sound and
graphics images (both still and moving) in personal computers. Interac-
tive encyclopedias allow users to not only read text about a given person or
historical event, but also to view and hear newsclips of the event.26 Most
of these sounds and images can be captured by the user and altered or
combined with other electronic works.
27
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AS APPLIED TO MULTIMEDIA
There are myriad legal issues inherent in combining multiple indus-
tries in order to create new technologies. Antitrust and regulatory issues
raised by the recently announced mergers and partnerships deserve their
own detailed commentary, which is certainly beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. While mergers such as the now-abandoned merger announced by
Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications 28 caused some members of Con-
gress to urge the Justice Department's antitrust division and other agen-
cies to investigate before approving the deal, the Clinton Administration
cautiously supported the merger.29 In addition, as entertainment, com-
munications and computer companies seek strategic alliances, they are
not raising antitrust objections; they are instead urging the federal govern-
ment not to interfere with the mergers.30 Whether the Clinton Adminis-
26. For example, Britannica Software has put Compton's Encyclopedia, which contains
nine million text words, 15,000 still images, 45 moving-image sequences and 60 audio min-
utes, on one CD-ROM disk. Barbara Zimmerman, The Tangle of Multimedia Rights, PUBLISHERS
WKL, Nov. 22, 1991, at 17.
Leonard Bernstein's personal archive, including correspondence, musical manuscripts,
photographs, recordings and memorabilia, is to be donated to the Library of Congress,
which plans to digitally copy the materials. Allan Kozinn, Bernstein Archive to be Digitized for
Public Access, N.Y. TiwEs, Nov. 9,1993, at C17. It is planned that sometime in the future other
researchers and music lovers will be able to use computers, for example, to view correspon-
dence by the composer, note a reference to a piece of music, retrieve music, as well as watch
a video of the piece being performed-all from a computer workstation thousands of miles
away. Id.
27. Eastman Kodak has, for example, a system for storing images with color-photo reso-
lution. Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 17. If a personal computer user can see it or hear it,
he or she can essentially capture and digitally manipulate it with the addition of a few pieces
of equipment:
(I] have now heard the famous fake-orgasm scene from When Harry Met Sally ...
approximately a million times as a ... file in PC multimedia soundtracks. It's funny,
it's unexpected, audiences (usually) love it. That track must be a close second to the
collected works of the [Monty] Python [sound bytes] in terms of multimedia copy-
right abuse. Meg Ryan's coital exclamations and "Bring out yer dead" are an odd
pair, but some apparently think they have broad meaning for our times.
Jim Seymour, The Multimedia Copyright Swamp, PC MAG., Feb. 23, 1993, at 99.
28. Markoff, supra note 1, at Al.
29. See Edmund L. Andrews, Sudden Synergy Among Communications Rivals, N.Y. TimEs,
Oct. 21, 1993, at DI; Geraldine Fabrikant, Bell Atlantic Deal for 2 Cable Giants Put at $33 Billion,
N.Y. TIMrs, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al; Daniel Pearl & Mark Robichaux, First White House Signal Has
Look of a Green Light, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A6; John J. Keller & Laura Landro, Bell
Atlantic, Viacon Chairmen Snipe At Each Other as Senators Study Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993,
at B8.
30. Andrews, supra note 29, at 101.
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tration will take any antitrust action related to the various mergers and
strategic alliances is unknown.
3 1
The aggressive participation of telecommunications and cable compa-
nies in multimedia also raises FCC concerns. 3 2 The FCC has cleared the
way though for local telephone companies to transmit video services pro-
vided by third parties, and has further allowed them to own as much as five
percent of video programmers.
33
Licensing issues complicate the multimedia picture. As a result of the
mixture of different publishers involved in multimedia (software, text,
images, and music), legal issues related to general contracting and licens-
ing remain undefined. Licensing concepts and procedures familiar to the
entertainment industry may be foreign to the computer industry, and vice
versa.3
4
As the software, film, music and book publication industries merge
into the multimedia publishing world, rights acquisition must now include
a number of new permissions, such as digital rights, transmittal rights, and
rights for multiple showings of a work.3 5 These industries operate under
different practice histories and statutory controls. Music composers, for
example, have a statutorily mandated right to record any song.36 Rather
than attempt to retain control over their individual works, composers gen-
erally accept public performance license fees administered and enforced
by their major rights collectives, ASCAP and BMI. 37 The rights situation
for still images-photos, art, cartoons, etc.-is, on the other hand, cha-
otic.3 8 "Rights to copyrighted works are owned by individual artists and
their estates, who are completely unorganized and whose fees and terms
vary too widely to be described at all."
3 9
"The movie companies that own the rights to their films, and TV pro-
duction companies that own most TV shows have been accustomed to sell-
31. Bob Davis & Joe Davidson, Clinton Team Is Split About Antitrust Policy As Big Mergers
Wait, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at Al.
Antitrust policy runs along one of the fault lines of the Clinton administration,
separating populist trustbusters from new-age technologists. Right now, the two
forces exist in a relatively stable condition. But that could explode in dissension as
the government takes up such high-profile deals as the Bell Atlantic Corp.-Tele-
Communications Inc. merger and sorts out its policy in the high-tech, health and
defense industries.
Id.
32. SeeJames Gleick, We Are the Wired: Some Views on the Fiberoptic Ties That Bind: A Frontier
That Is Building Itself N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 4, at 16 (explaining that the blending of
telephones and television will require more than FCC approval).
33. Beth Melville, Interactive Video Projects Test Technology, Limits of Law, TELEPHONE WE.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 5, 6.
34. Michael D. Scott & James L. Talbott, Multimedia: What Is It, Why Is It Important And
What Do I Need To Know About It?, COMPUTER L. ASS'N BULL., Vol. 8 No.3, 1993, at 14.
35. See Multimedia Seminar Stresses Control of Rights, PUBLISHERS WKL, May 17, 1993, at 16;
Billie Munro, Copyrights and Multimedia, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEOOIsc MONITOR, Mar. 1993.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). See also Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 18 (explaining that
the right to record any song is the only permission in the United States whose basic terms are
statutorily mandated).
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ing short clips for use in television productions or for commercials."40
While short clips from old films and TV shows are relatively easy to license,
longer sections and clips of any size from very well-known and recent
works are almost impossible to obtain.4 1 In addition, permissions are
needed from all the creators involved-writers, directors, musicians and
every actor appearing on the clip.
42
At present, consistent industry practices for licensing all multimedia
elements do not exist.43 The result is that multimedia publishers will
often find it more economical and practical to create all the various works
incorporated in a product.44 Efforts are underway, however, to improve
the multimedia licensing environment.
4 5
The technology complicates multimedia licensing issues. Scanners,
sound boards, and multimedia authoring programs make it very easy to
record sights and sounds.46 "Therein lies a dilemma for most new PC
[personal computer] multimedia devotees: How far can you go, both le-
gally and practically, in lifting pictures, sound, and video from the world
around you for PC use?" 47 The industry response has been inconsistent.
Some multimedia publishers distribute electronic images which require
the purchase of publication rights for any additional reproduction while
others allow the user to freely reproduce the information (short of whole-
sale verbatim copying in competition with the original publisher). 48 Li-
censing issues are moot, however, unless the medium is subject to
copyright protection.
To properly anticipate the level of copyright protection that will be
available to multimedia products, it is imperative to understand the cur-
rent scope of protection afforded multimedia's principal precursor-com-
puter programs. A brief overview of the historical development of
computer software copyright protection is insightful.
40. Id. These sales come at a very steep price, however. Id.
41. Id.
42. Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 17-18.
43. Id.; Seymour, supra note 27 at 99; Multimedia Seminar Stresses Control of Rights, supra
note 33 at 16; Kozinn, supra note 26, at C17 (discussing the fact that licensing and technolog-
ical hurdles must be overcome before Leonard Bernstein's personal archive can be copied to
a computer by the Library of Congress).
44. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 19; Seymour, supra note 27, at 99.
45. See Brian Kahin, The IMA Intellectual Property Projet, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONI-
TOR, Mar. 1993. The Interactive Multimedia Association has created the Intellectual Property
Project with the goal of facilitating the licensing of content to multimedia applications and
the licensing of multimedia applications to users. Id.
46. See Seymour, supra note 27, at 99. Some of the concerns go beyond licensing issues.
The Computer Emergency Response Team, established by the Pentagon's Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, recently issued a warning advisory to users of Sun Microsystems work
stations with built-in microphones that someone could electronically eavesdrop on conversa-
tions taking place near the computer. John Markoff, Kping Things Safe and Orderly In the
Neighborhoods of Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 4, at 7.




A. Computer Software Copyright Issues
Identifying the specific copyright issues raised by emerging mul-
timedia technologies is difficult because the technology is both new and
evolving.49 In addition, United States copyright protection has historically
lagged behind technological developments. From the first Copyright Act
in 179050 up to the present Copyright Act,5 1 Congress has amended
the Act numerous times specifically to incorporate technological
developments.
52
Copyright protection arises from the constitutional provision granting
Congress the power to pass laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."5 3 " [T] he pur-
pose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information,
to promote learning, culture and development."
54
In 1976, Congress attempted to embrace current and future techno-
logical developments by enacting an all-encompassing scope of copyright
protection. The Copyright Act of 1976 5 extends copyright protection to
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."5 6 This broad definition of protection would appear
49. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
50. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). This first Copy-
right Act limited protection to "any map, chart, book or books already printed." Id.
51. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
52. Congress extended copyright protection to designs, prints, etchings and engravings
in 1802, musical compositions in 1831, dramatic compositions in 1856, photographs and the
"negatives thereof" in 1865, and statuary and "models or designs intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts" in 1870. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171, repealed by
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 14, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439, amended byAct of Aug. 18, 1856, ch.
169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 13 Stat. 540, 540,
repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
In 1909, Congress attempted a broader approach to the types of works to be protected
by extending protection to "all the writings of an author." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4,
35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4
(West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed 1976). Again, Congress was forced to amend
the Copyright Act in response to technological developments. In 1912, motion pictures were
added (Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(l)-(m), 37 Stat. 488, 488 (previously codified at 17
U.S.C. § 5(l)-(m), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(l)-(m), recodified 1947, repealed 1976)),
as were sound recordings in 1972 (Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1 (b), 85 Stat.
391, 391 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. App. § 5(n), re-
pealed 1976)).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
55. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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to encompass every conceivable multimedia product.5 7 The actual scope
of copyright protection available to multimedia is in reality unclear, re-
gardless of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Despite the fact that Congress made significant attempts to incorpo-
rate technology into the copyright framework, 58 defining the scope of
copyright protection available to electronic-based works, particularly com-
puter software, has been wrought with confusion and imprecise judicial
analysis. 59 "Defining the scope of software copyright has become one of
the most intractable problems in the emerging field of computer law." 60
In order to establish computer software copyright infringement, the
owner of the allegedly infringed work (usually the plaintiff) must both
establish ownership of that work and that it was copied.61 A Certificate of
Registration, if timely obtained, constitutes prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright. 62 Because the act of copying is rarely proved
through direct evidence,6s copying may be proved inferentially by showing
that the alleged infringer (usually the defendant) had access to the copy-
righted work and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar
to the copyrighted work.6 4 "Ultimately, to prove factual copying, the
plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact
finder, taking together the evidence of access and the similarities between
57. This statement is probably only true for the near term. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything
New Since CONTU?, 106 ELARv. L. REv. 977, 1073 (1993). Mr. Miller concludes that for the
foreseeable future, copyright protection extends to computer programs created by other
computer programs because of the human involvement in the creation of the programs
through artificial intelligence. Id.
58. In 1974, Congress created the National Commission for New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) with the purpose of studying the use of the copyright laws for
"automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information,"
and to make recommendations to ensure that such works were protected by the copyright
laws. Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201 (b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974). For a thorough discus-
sion of CONTU and its impact on current computer software copyright protection, see
Miller, supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 57, at 980; John W. L. Ogilvie, Defining Computer Program
Parts Under Learned Hand's Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MicH. L.
REy. 526, 526-27 (1992); Mary L. Mills, New Technology.and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 307, 309 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, The Ups and Downs of Look and Fe
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE A.C.M., Apr. 1993, at 29; and BriefAMICUS CURIAE of Eleven Copy-
right Professors in Sega Enterprises, Inc. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JuiMETRics J. 147, 148 (1992).
60. Richard A. Beutel, Software Engineering Practices and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can
Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JuIMEamTcs J. 1, 1
(1991). For additional commentaries regarding the difficulty in defining the scope of com-
puter software copyright protection, see id. at 1 n.1.
61. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); 3 MELvIL.E B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON CoPYRGHT, § 13.01 at 13-15 (1993).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 831
(10th Cir. 1993).
63. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231; Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
64. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231-32.
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the programs, could find that the second work was copied from the
first."6 5
Critical to the determination of illicit copying is the differentiation
between a work's expression and its underlying ideas. The overriding con-
cern of courts has been to ensure that copyright protection is not ex-
tended to ideas but only to the expression of ideas.6 6 This principle was
first expressed by the Supreme Court67 and recently codified in the Copy-
right Act.6 8 As modestly stated by the Second Circuit, "[d]rawing the line
between idea and expression is a tricky business."
69
Initially, computer software was viewed primarily as a utilitarian form
of literary work.70 Faced with a new form of an original "work," courts had
no choice but to turn to more traditional examples of literary works, such
as dramatic performances and fictional works, to formulate methods to
determine the scope of copyright protection available to computer
programs.
7 1
Before 1980, the Copyright Act never specifically mentioned com-
puter programs, though Congress did intend that software and other
forms of electronic works be provided protection. 72 The 1980 amend-
65. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 833.
66. E.g.,Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d. 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992).
67. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(holding that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a
similar book, using a similar plan, which achieved similar results, where the alleged infringer
made a different arrangement of the columns and headings).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1988) provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
69. Computer Assocs. Int', 982 F.2d at 704.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., id. at 706-07. Computer programs and software are synonymous. The Copy-
right Act defines a computer program as "[a] set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988). Software is a generic reference to computer programs, as contrasted with computer
hardware, which refers to the computer equipment itself, including its electronic compo-
nents and peripheral devices (such as printers and disk drives).
72. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990).
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of
works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion has
fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and technologi-
cal developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never
existed before. In some of these cases the new expressive forms - electronic music,
filmstrips, and computer programs, for example - could be regarded as an extension
of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were
thus considered copyrightable from the outset without need of new legislation. In
other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory
enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable
works.
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The
bill [to enact the 1976 Copyright Act] does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or
to allow unlimited expansion into areas outside the present congressional intent.
H.R.RP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. ADMiN. NEws 5659,
5664 (emphasis added); Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass.
1990).
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ment to the Copyright Act 73 and initial judicial decisions clearly estab-
lished that computer programs are, if original, proper subject matter for
copyright protection:
[T] he category of "literary works".. is not confined to literature
in the nature of Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls. The defini-
tion of "literary works" in section 101 [of the 1976 Copyright Act]
includes expression not only in words but also "numbers, or
other.., numerical symbols or indicia," thereby expanding the
common usage of "literary works." Thus a computer program,
whether in object code or source code, is a "literary work" and is
protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or
source code version.
7 4
The focus of early software copyright cases such as Apple Computer v.
Franklin Computer75 was upon the copyrightability of computer programs
in their various forms.7 6 At issue in the early cases was not so much
whether the computer programs in question had been copied by the de-
fendants (or were substantially similar), but whether the programs them-
selves were subject to copyright protection. 77 At present, it is undisputed
that literal manifestations of computer programs, provided they are origi-
nal, are copyrightable.
78
What degree of copyright protection is available for non-literal mani-
festations of computer programs has proved to be an issue of concern for
judges, commentators, attorneys, and software professionals. Whelan Asso-
73. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
74. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (citations omitted).
75. Id.
76. See id. Computer programs are represented in two literal forms: source code is the
literal text of a program's instructions written in a human-readable programming language.
Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531; Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp. at 44. Source code is then translated
into a machine-readable form, known as object code, which the computer uses to actually
implement the program's instructions. Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531; Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp.
at 44.
The purpose of a computer program is also generally categorized by whether it is an
application program or an operating system program. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249-
52. An application program is one that a computer user generally uses to interact with a
computer, such as a word processing program, a spreadsheet program, or an accounting
program. An operating system program is one that provides basic instructions to the com-
puter for its internal operations. A computer user may instruct an application program to
save a spreadsheet file; it is the operating system program that will receive the instruction
from the application program and provide the instructions to the computer hardware to
carry out the actual file saving procedures.
In Apple Computer, Franklin had argued that operating system programs were not copy-
rightable under the premise that they were methods or processes, which are not copyright-
able subject-matter pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Id. at 1250; supra note 68. The court in
Apple Computer flatly rejected Franklin's argument, relying on the CONTU Final Report
which stated that works of a program which are "used ultimately in the implementation of a
process should in no way affect their copyrightability." Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252.
77. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253; Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521,
524-25 (9th Cir. 1984).




ciates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratoy,79 was one of the first cases to specifically
address this issue and provides a perfect example of how it is raised. Whe-
lan developed a dental laboratory management computer program forJas-
low, with Whelan retaining the ownership of the program.80 Jaslow later
decided to create its own version of the program.81 Because the programs
were written in two different programming languages, they were not liter-
ally similar.8 2 The court in Whelan Associates found, however, that the two
programs were substantially similar, not in their literal manifestations, but
in their overall structure and organization.
8 3
The rule of law that literal similarities are not necessary to establish
infringement was established long before the creation of computer pro-
grams: "[A] n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition
or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the matter of
any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more
or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy."84 Copyright protec-
tion "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations."
85
Rather than dealing with exact, literal copying, courts have been
forced to consider whether similarities between two works are the result of
impermissible copying by the alleged infringer.8 6 Critical to determining
whether there has been a copyright infringement in these situations is
whether the defendant has impermissibly copied too much of the plain-
tiff's original expression.8 7 Separating protectable expression from its un-
derlying ideas, however, has proved difficult and controversial.88
The real task in a copyright infringement action, then, is to de-
termine whether there has been copying of the expression of an
idea rather than just the idea itself. "[N] o one infringes, unless
he descends so far into what is concrete [in a work] as to invade
... [its] expression." Only this expression may be protected and
only it may be infringed.
8 9
79. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
80. Id. at 1225.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1225. "Each programming language has a unique grammar and set of mean-
ings. Two programs may perform the same functions despite differences in their source
code. Conversely, two programs with nearly identical source code can perform very differ-
ently." Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531.
83. WWIan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1248.
84. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
85. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
86. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1163.
88. "The difficulty comes in attempting to distill the unprotected idea from the pro-
tected expression." Id.
89. Id. (quoting National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600
(2d Cir. 1951)).
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This separation between idea and expression is accomplished
through the "abstractions test" first articulated by Judge Learned Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.90
Upon any work, and especially upon a [dramatic] play, a
great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally
well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the
play is about, and at times might consist of only its title; but there
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended.9 1
Courts must therefore determine not only whether two works are sub-
stantially similar, but also whether the similarities involve protected ex-
pression.92 Courts have been faced with the dual roles of determining
whether the works, as a whole, are so similar that copying is inferred by the
similarity, and whether protectable expression was indeed copied.
9 3
There "must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of
the expressions of those ideas as well."9 4 Initially, courts applied an "ex-
trinsic/intrinsic" analysis to determine substantial similarity.95
The "extrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial similarity
of ideas. 96 The "intrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial sim-
ilarity in expressions.97 This second test has also been referred to as the
'ordinary observer"9 8 test because it is made solely from the perspective of
the lay observer without the assistance of experts. 99 Application of the
intrinsic test is particularly difficult. "As Judge Hand candidly observed,
'Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Decisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.'"100
If a substantial similarity of ideas is established through the extrinsic
test, then the trier of fact must apply the intrinsic test to determine
whether the expression of the ideas is substantially similar so as to consti-
90. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
91. Id. at 121.
92. Sid & Many Kroffi Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 1164.
95. See id. at 1164-66.
96. Id. at 1164.
It is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but
on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed. Such criteria include the type
of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a matter of law.
Id.
97. Id.
98. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Sid & Many Kroffi Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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tute infringement.1 0 ' The Whelan Associates court followed this basic line
of reasoning to find infringement resulting from the substantial similarity
of non-literal expressions.
10 2
As the Whelan Associates court noted, applying the extrinsic/intrinsic
test to determine whether the non-literal elements of computer programs
are substantially similar is not without its failings. "The ordinary observer
test, which was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings,
and which does not permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases
involving computer programs on account of the programs' complexity
and unfamiliarity to most members of the public."' 0 3 This criticism has
gained acceptance in infringement cases not involving software,' 0 4 and
was also adopted by the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado
in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American.'
0 5
The result is that courts have been relying upon experts to dissect the
works in question and to assist in determining whether the dissected ele-
ments are substantially similar.' 0 6 There is a threat, however, that in fo-
cusing on the second element of this test, whether protectable expressions
have been copied, courts are ignoring the first element of the test, namely
whether the works as a whole are substantially similar.
01 7
101. Id.
102. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232-33, 1238-40.
103. Id. at 1232.
Moreover, the distinction between the two parts of the ... [extrinsic/intrinsic]
test may be of doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same person for each
step: that person has been exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he
is supposed to ignore or "forget" that evidence in analyzing the problem under the
second step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the "forgetting" can be
effective when the expert testimony is essential to even the most fundamental un-
derstanding of the objects in question.
Id. at 1232-33.
104. In Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We suspect that courts have been slow to recognize explicitly the need for refin-
ing the ordinary observer test in such a way that it would adopt the perspective of
the intended audience because, in most fact scenarios, the general lay public fairly
represents the works' intended audience.... Fortunately, the advent of computer
programming infringement actions has forced courts to recognize that sometimes
the non-interested or uninformed lay observer simply lacks the necessary expertise
to determine similarities or differences between products.
As Whelan reveals, only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a
court to embrace a doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of
someone who is ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between two
works. Instead the judgment should be informed by people who are familiar with
the media at issue.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
105. 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1513 (D. Colo. 1992), affid inpart, vacated inpart, 9 F.3d 823 (10th
Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 1513-14.
107. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir.
1993).
We suggest that a court will often be assisted in determining the factual issue of
copying if both programs are first compared in their entirety without filtering out
the unprotected elements. Such a preliminary step does not obviate the ultimate
need to compare just the protected elements of the copyrighted program with the
alleged infringing program. However, an initial holistic comparison may reveal a pattern
of copying that is not obvious when only certain components are examined
Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
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Again, because the Copyright Act does not protect ideas, only their
expressions,10 8 courts must delineate between abstract ideas and protect-
able expression. In Whelan Associates, the court held that "the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the ex-
pression of the idea."1° 9 This holding has been severely criticized as being
overly simplistic when confronting the intricacies of computer
programming. 110
Unfortunately, however, courts can only give general guidance as to
how to differentiate between ideas underlying a computer program and
protectable expressions of those ideas. "Application of the abstractions
test will necessarily vary from case-to-case and program-to-program. Given
the complexity and ever-changing nature of computer technology, we de-
cline to set forth any strict methodology for the abstraction of computer
programs."
111
The "abstractions test" is not the only method employed by courts to
ensure that copyright protection is extended only to protectable expres-
sion. If there is only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expres-
sion will be deemed to have merged. Under the "merger" doctrine, no
protection will be granted the expression because doing so would effec-
tively grant copyright protection to the underlying idea.
1 12
108. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
109. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1236. As the court stated in relation to the infringed
Dentalab program:
[T] he idea of the Dentalab program was the efficient management of a dental labo-
ratory (which presumably has significantly different requirements from those of
other businesses). Because that idea could be accomplished in a number of differ-
ent ways with a number of different structures, the structure of the Dentalab pro-
gram is part of the program's expression, not its idea.
Id. at 1236 n.28.
110. For a discussion of the specific criticisms leveled at this aspect of the Whelan deci-
sion, see Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705-06 (2nd Cir. 1992),
111. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 834-35. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37 (D.Mass. 1990) provided the same guidance:
[I]n making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker must focus
upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive, along the scale
from the most generalized conception to the most particularized, and choose some formula-
tion-some conception or definition of the "idea"-for the purpose of distinguish-
ing between the idea and its expression.
Id. at 60. One commentator has suggested that courts adopt a standardized approach to
separating the basic elements of computer programs into six levels of generally declining
abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the program structure or architecture, (iii) modules,
(iv) algorithms and data structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code. See Ogilvie, supra
note 59, at 533. This approach was applied in Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 835. But see Computer
Assoc., 982 F.2d at 707:
Initially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical
plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and isolate
each level of abstraction contained within it. This process begins with the code and
ends with an articulation of the program's ultimate function. Along the way, it is
necessary essentially to retrace and map each of the designer's steps - in the oppo-
site order in which they were taken during the program's creation.
Computer Assoc., 982 F.2d at 707.
112. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838; Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,




Closely related to the merger doctrine are concerns about efficiency:
[W] hen one considers the fact that programmers generally strive
to create programs "that meet the user's needs in the most effi-
cient manner," the applicability of the merger doctrine to com-
puter programs becomes compelling. In the context of computer
program design, the concept of efficiency is akin to deriving the
most concise logical proof or formulating the most succinct
mathematical computation. Thus, the more efficient a set of modules
are, the more closely they approximate the idea or process embodied in that
particular aspect of the program's structure.
1 13
There are three additional restrictions to protection which relate to
originality. "To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original
to the author."1 14 Under the scenes afaire doctrine, protection is denied to
expressions which are standard, stock, or common to a particular topic or
that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting such as hardware
specifications. 1
1 5
Granting copyright protection to the necessary incidents of
an idea would effectively afford a monopoly to the first program-
mer to express those ideas. Furthermore, where a particular ex-
pression is common to the treatment of a particular idea,
process, or discovery, it is lacking in the originality that is the sine
qua non for copyright protection.
i 1 6
The second restriction is that facts are not afforded copyright protec-
tion. Facts exist independently of the discoverer, who is not the author of
the facts but merely the recorder.1 17 Finally, the third restriction is that
expressions which are in the public domain, and therefore not original to
the author, are not afforded protection. 118
While some subsequent courts agree that the Whelan Associates court's
overall approach for determining infringement for non-literal elements
was basically sound,11 9 significant attempts have been made to formulate
more precise analyses.' 20 In Lotus Development v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional1 2 1 Judge Keeton formulated a three-part process: 1) the underlying
idea of the work must be identified; 2) individual elements of expression
which comprise the work must be evaluated to determine whether each
expression is limited to the functional requirements of the work or is in
the public domain, or whether, conversely, it constitutes an original ex-
113. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Computer As-
sociates essentially states that if a programmer selects a particular implementation methodol-
ogy because it is the most efficient approach, that expression merges with its underlying idea
and is unprotectable. Id.
114. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
115. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838.
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 348; Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837.
118. See Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837-38; Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
119. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 7050; Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 840.
120. See, e.g., Ogilvie, supra note 59 at 550-59 (identifying four distinct substantial similar-
ity tests: (1) the iterative test; (2) the structure, sequence and organization (SSO) test; (3)
the "look and feel" or "total concept and feel" test; and (4) the successive filtering test).
121. 740 F. Supp 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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pression; and 3) to determine copyrightability of the work, it must be de-
termined whether any of the elements not determined to be limited to the
functional requirements of the work or in the public domain constitute a
substantial part of the work.
122
Currently, the analysis gaining the most acceptance by courts is the
"Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test adopted by the Second Circuit in
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.123 In step one of this test, the
court applied a traditional abstractions test.124 In step two, expressive ele-
ments which do not qualify for protection were filtered out in order to
separate protectable expression from non-protectable material. 125 In the
third and final step:
Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed
program which are "ideas" or are dictated by efficiency or exter-
nal factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a
core of protectable expression.... At this point, the court's sub-
stantial similarity inquiry focuses on whether the defendant cop-
ied any aspect of this protected expression, as well as an
assessment of the copied portion's relative importance with re-
spect to the plaintiff's overall program. 126
The "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test was substantially
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus-
tries. 2 7 Judge Keeton applied his three-part substantial similarity test in
the subsequent case of Lotus Development v. Borland International,128 and
ruled that it is fundamentally compatible with the "Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison" test. 12 9 The Ninth Circuit and the District Court for the
122. Id. at 60
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker
must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive,
along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particularized,
and choose some formulation - some conception or definition of the "idea" - for
the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression
of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every expres-
sion of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are a
substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable "work."
Id. at 61.
123. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
124. Id. at 706-07
125. Id. at 707. This process entails examining the structural components at each level of
abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was "idea" or was
dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; re-
quired by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence
nonprotectable expression. Id.
126. Id. at 710.
127. 9 F.3d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
128. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
129. Id. at 211-12.
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Northern District of California have also effectively adopted the "Abstrac-
tion-Filtration-Comparison" test.
13 0
The principal difficulty with the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
test is that, taken to its logical extreme, a work may be found to contain no
protectable elements of expression, and is, therefore, not subject to copy-
right protection. The Whelan Associates court found support in the Copy-
right Act as well as prior decisions for its holding that the structure and
organization of a computer program can be proper subjects of copyright
protection.1 31 Recently, the Supreme Court expressly reinforced that a
work containing no individual protectable expressions can still be subject
to copyright protection.13 2 In language very similar to Whelan Associates,
the Supreme Court stated:
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to in-
clude, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the col-
lected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These
choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are
made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal de-
gree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may pro-
tect such compilations through the copyright laws. Thus, even a
directory that contains absolutely no protectable written expres-
sion, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright
protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.' 33
Granted, the level of protection provided is very thin.1 3 4 "[A] subse-
quent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's publi-
130. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993); Atari Games v.
Nintendo of Am., No. C 88-4805 FMS, C 89-0027 FMS, 1993 WL 207548, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 1993); Apple Computer v. Microsoft, 821 F. Supp. 616, 623 (N.D. Cal 1993).
131. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1239.
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides ... support... that Congress intended
that the structure and organization of a literary work could be part of its expression
protectable by copyright. Title 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) specifically extends copyright
protection to compilations and derivative works. Title 17 U.S.C. § 101, defines
"compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship," and it defines
"derivative work," as one "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as ...
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "or-
der" or "structure,"'it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative
works, and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that
the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, i.e., that the se-
quence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work.
Id. The Whelan Court also based its decision on early cases which held that a copyright
infringement can exist in the absence of literal similarities. Id. at 1234; see also Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (thirteen alleged
distinctive plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars may be basis for a finding
of copyright violation); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (similarities between McDonaldland characters and H.R. Pufnstuf
characters can be established by " ' total concept and feel'" of the two productions).
132. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1991). Compilations
of facts generally are copyrightable. Id. at 344
133. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
134. Id.
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cation to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work
does not feature the same selection and arrangemenL"'
3 5
Courts must be careful in their pursuit of this "protectable core" I3 6 of
a compiler's work. As noted by one commentator:
Hypothesize two computer programs that contain many of
the same nonliteral elements, and an efficiency and scenes a faire
analysis that revealed that, in each instance, several practical op-
tions to those nonliteral elements existed. The correspondence
between the programs, taken in the aggregate, would be beyond
coincidence. Nevertheless, a mechanical application of an ex-
pansive merger doctrine might dictate that these similarities
should be eliminated from consideration in the court's filtration
analysis, and could lead the court to conclude that the plaintiffs
program was completely unprotectable. Unless the Altai process
is invested with some flexibility, it could defeat Congress's desire
to accord computer programs full copyright protection, and de-
prive authors of these works of Congress's intended incentives
and rewards 137
The Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc. court itself recognized, to
a limited degree, the potential pitfalls of its analysis.
1 38
In order to impose liability for copyright infringement, the basic ap-
proach taken by courts is to "find that the defendant copied protectable
elements of the plaintiffs program and that those protectable elements
comprise a substantial part of the plaintiff's program when it is considered
as a whole."' 3 9 At present, there is very little guidance as to what non-
literal elements of an allegedly infringed computer program are protect-
able, as well as whether those elements comprise a substantial part of the
program. For example, in Lotus Development v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional'40 Judge Keeton examined the non-literal elements of the popular
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program.' 41 It is not exactly clear which specific
element Judge Keeton found to be protectable. On the one hand, Judge
Keeton found that the structure, sequence, and organization of the pro-
gram's menu command system constituted a substantial part of the alleged
135. I& at 349 (emphasis added).
136. "Protectable core" means those compilations of facts that are sufficiently original in
their use, order of placement, and arrangement. See supra note 133-35 and accompanying
teXL
137. Miller, supra note 57, at 1010 n.156.
138. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
[W]e are cognizant that computer technology is a dynamic field which can quickly
outpace judicial decisionmaking. Thus, in cases where the technology in question
does not allow for a literal application of the... [Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
test], our opinion should not be read to foreclose the district courts of our circuit
from utilizing a modified version.
Id.
139. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Autos-
kill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 1476, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1993)).
140. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
141. Id. at 51-52.
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copyrighted work.142  Judge Keeton then merely concluded that
"copyrightability of the user interface of [Lotus] 1-2-3 is established." 143
It is interesting to note that Judge Keeton's determination that the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system is a substantial part of the program is
based solely upon the finding that "[t] he user interface of [Lotus] 1-2-3 is its
most unique element, and is the aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular.
That defendants went to such trouble to copy that element is a testament
to its substantiality."144
The defendants in Lotus Development attempted to create a "feature-
for-feature work-a-like for [Lotus] 1-2-3." 14 5 Because infringement was
based solely upon the copying of the Lotus 1-2-3 user command system,
one must wonder if Lotus may have found itself with an essentially unpro-
tected computer program if the defendants had not copied the Lotus 1-2-3
menu command system essentially verbatim.
Judge Keeton then found the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system to
be an original expression and thus protectable, 146 despite the fact that the
ordering of the menu command structure was presented in predicted or-
der of "frequency of use rather than alphabetically." 147 In other words,
the structure of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system was significantly
dictated by considerations of efficiency. The Second Circuit has indicated
that when programmers strive to "meet the user's needs in the most effi-
cient manner"; however, idea and expression may have merged and there-
fore, protection is not available.
1 48
Copyright protection arises from the Constitutional provision grant-
ing Congress the power to pass laws "[t] o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 149 "[T]he
purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id.
144. I. The defendants in Lotus had attempted to create a spreadsheet which was com-
pletely "compatible" with Lotus 1-2-3, hence the decision to copy Lotus 1-2-3 as closely as
possible. Id. at 69. Judge Keeton pointed out, however, that the defendants' premise that
they had to have an identical menu command structure proved "incorrect in hindsight." Id.
For example, a spreadsheet program created by Microsoft has proved commercially success-
ful despite having a different menu command system. Id. It is difficult to understand how
the Lotus 1-2-3 user command system can be so substantial, based partly on the fact that
defendants had gone to the trouble of copying it, when the defendants' purpose for copying
it is essentially commercially pointless. See id. at 68.
145. Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp. at 69.
146. Id. at 68. "I conclude that a menu command structure is capable of being expressed
in many if not an unlimited number of ways, and that the command structure of 1-2-3 is an
original and nonobvious way of expressing a command structure." I&
147. I. at 67.
148. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Cpyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L REV.
1045, 1052 (1989)). See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
149. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information,
to promote learning, culture and development."
150
The defendants in Lotus had made every effort to produce an identi-
cal version of the plaintiff's program in order to achieve commercial suc-
cess. 151 In fact, they even discarded certain improved features because
they were not completely compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.152 Protecting
against such illicit copying clearly falls within the balance the copyright
laws are designed to achieve.
155
The issue arises whether the same analysis applied by Judge Keeton in
Lotus should be applied when a competing program, which contains a
completely different menu command structure and is considered superior
to Lotus 1-2-3,154 also contains a feature which emulates the Lotus 1-2-3
menu command system. 155 When a computer program is independently
created and is considered an improvement over its competing works,
keeping in mind the balance to be struck between protecting authors and
promoting learning, culture and development, it is arguable that incorpo-
ration of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system into an optional feature
is not copying a substantial part of the Lotus 1-2-3 program. 15 6 Regard-
less, judge Keeton subsequently ruled in Lotus Development v. Borland Inter-
national that Borland's Quattro programs infringed upon Lotus 1-2-3:
150. Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
151. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass. 1990).
152. Id.
153. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); 3 MvLviLLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 at 13-15 (1993).
154. See Peter H. Lewis, When Computing Power Is Generated By The Lauyers, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1990, at F4.
155. See Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp 203, 222 (D. Mass. 1992). The Lotus
court stated:
That Borland, in developing the Quattro programs, has added functional and
expressive elements that do not exist in [Lotus] 1-2-3 is irrelevant in view of the fact
that Borland copied virtually the whole menu command structure of 1-2-3 into its
emulation interfaces. Borland's additions have caused some variation in the man-
ner in which the elements taken from 1-2-3 are expressed in the Quattro pro-
grams.... A decisionmaker in this case (whether judge or jury) must ignore the
added expression to the extent that it does not change the expression Borland cop-
ied from Lotus. I conclude that no reasonable jury could find for Borland that Bor-
land did not take the menu commands, menu command structure . . . and
keystroke sequences substantially as they were.
Id.
156. It is interesting to note that Microsoft offers a feature in its spreadsheet program,
Excel, which allows users to display a menu system with the same Lotus 1-2-3 commands
(though expressed vertically instead of horizontally). By pressing the same keystrokes as if
they were using Lotus 1-2-3, Excel will then execute the equivalent command through its own
menu command system. To date, Lotus has not instituted a suit for infringement against




"The extent of copying of copyrightable elements of 1-2-3 rendered the
Quattro programs substantially similar to 1-2-3."157
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the question of which non-literal
elements are copyrightable. In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American158 the
district court found that the defendants had infringed the plaintiff's copy-
right for a computer program it used in its course of business. 15 9 Many of
the individual defendants were former employees of the plaintiff who
worked for one of the corporate defendants.16  One of the individual de-
fendants allegedly stated that when he left the plaintiffs employ, he
brought with him to the defendant all the computer files he could "get his
hands on."1 61 In addition, the district court found the testimony of the
individual defendant who claimed to have independently created the al-
legedly infringing program unbelievable.
1 62
In this case, significant evidence was presented that the defendants
illicitly copied the plaintiff's copyrighted computer program. 16 3 The
Tenth Circuit, however, has remanded the case back to the district court
on the issue of copyright infringement.1 64 They instructed the district
court to determine through application of the Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison test whether the defendants' copying constitutes actionable
infringement. 165
While these cases indicate that courts are willing to provide only a
very narrow range of protection for non-literal elements of computer
programs, it must be kept in mind that Congress intended that computer
programs be provided copyright protection.1 66 The balancing between
protecting an author's work and dissemination of information' 6 7 has,
however, tilted toward dissemination. 1  Moreover, the fact that an au-
thor has expended considerable effort to produce an original work is of
no consequence. 169 The sine qua non of copyright is originality.
170
157. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. at 221. For an excellent review of this decision, see Martin
Glenn & Dale M. Cendali, Lotus Case Highlights Copyright Issues and High-Tech Problems, NAT'L.
L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at S17.
158. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992).
159. Id. at 1516.
160. Id. at 1502.
161. Id. at 1509.
162. Id. at 1520.
163. See id. at 1515, 1519-20.
164. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 72.
167. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
168. See supra notes 135-65; infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
169. Over time courts developed a theory known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine with
"the underlying notion ... that copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into
compiling facts." Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352. In Feist,
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine: "[T ] he 1976 revisions
to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone
of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works." Id. at 359-60.
170. Id. at 355.
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Computer programmers are then free to use the ideas contained in
other programs as long as they do not impermissibly copy protected ex-
pression.1 71 Developers have therefore examined computer programs to
extract the underlying ideas, and then passed those ideas to programmers
who have not seen the other program, and who then create their own
expression based on those ideas in a "clean room" environment.
172
Necessary to this "clean room" process is the making of intermediate
verbatim copies of the other work.173 Both the Federal and the Ninth
Circuits have held that making such intermediate copies is excused under
the "fair use" provisions of the Copyright AcL174 Noting that the legisla-
tive history of the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act "suggests that
courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate new techno-
logical innovations,"175 the Federal Circuit in Atari Games v. Nintendo of
America176 held that "[w]hen the nature of a work requires intermediate
copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that
nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying." 177 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit held in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade,178 "that where disassem-
bly179 is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legiti-
mate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copy-
righted work, as a matter of law."' 80
The Sega court further stated:
Disassembly of object code necessarily entails copying .... If dis-
assembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the
owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the func-
tional aspects of his work-aspects that were expressly denied
copyright protection by Congress.... In order to enjoy a lawful
monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a
work, the creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent stan-
dards imposed by the patent laws.181
171. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
172. See NEC v. Intel, 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
173. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
174. See Atari Games v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Atari court stated: "Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that 'fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or research' is not an infringement.'" Id.
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. Id. (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679-80).
176. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed Cir. 1992).
177. Id. at 843.
178. 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
179. Computer programs are translated from source code to object code through the use
of an "assembler" or "compiler." Disassembly, or decompiling, is the process of reconverting
object code into human-readable source code. See id.; see also supra note 76.
180. Id at 1514 n.2. In this case, the "legitimate" use was Accolade's attempts to bypass a
security system Sega had designed for its game cartridge consoles. Id. at 1527-28.
181. Id. at 1526 (citation omitted).
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Partly as a result of the latest decisions regarding software copyright pro-
tection, more and more software developers are seeking patent protec-
tion.1 82 Patent protection, however, will not necessarily provide a stable
environment for protection of the multimedia industry. The patent office
recently issued a patent to a publisher of an interactive CD-ROM encyclo-
pedia. Industry protests over the breadth of this particular patent led to
the patent office ordering a rare re-examination of the patent.
18 3
It is with this perspective of the copyright protection granted to com-
puter programs that this Article examines copyright protection as it ap-
plies to emerging multimedia applications. Because multimedia
applications are for the most part inextricably linked to computer
software,18 4 the above analysis is particularly applicable.
B. Multimedia Copyright Issues
The interactive aspect of multimedia which allows users to manipulate
sounds and images raises the most significant copyright issues. Sounds
and images (both still and motion) are, if original, copyrightable subject
matter. They are works of authorship fixed "in [a] ... tangible media of
expression... from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 185
The Copyright Act grants to the copyright owner the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, display, and to prepare derivative works
based upon their works.
186
182. See Michael J. Lennon, A Statistical Analysis of the Enforcement of United States Patents
Relating to Computer Software, THE COMPUTER L. Ass'N BULL., No. 2, 1993, at 3, 6 (concluding
that software-related patents appear to have fared at least as well, and possibly somewhat
better, as those issued for other technologies, when litigated in the federal district courts and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); see asoJohn S. Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School
of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. Rav. 119 (1991) (discussing how patent law can be applied to copy-
right protection issues).
183. See generallyJohn Markoff, A High-Technology Outcry Against the US. Patent System, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994, at C16; James Evans, Patently Offensive: Compton's CD-ROM Coup Could
Unleash Multimedia Litigation, L.A. DAiLYJ., Dec. 29, 1993, at 1; Peter H. Lewis, The New Patent
that is Infuriating the Multimedia Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, § 3, at 10.
184. See supra Part I.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) states:
Subject to sections 107 through 120 [17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120], the owner of copy-
right under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly, and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
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Computer technology makes it possible to make exact copies of origi-
nal sounds and images.' 87 Entire works, as well as "samples," are easily
copied. 188 The music industry has some experience with this form of
copying. Digital sampling was first introduced in the music industry in the
1970s. 189 The principal implication of digital sampling is that a person
may record small pieces (samples) of pre-existing works by others and
recombine those samples into a completely different work.190 While digi-
tal sampling may involve as little as three words, 19 1 it can also involve sub-
stantial portions of a previous recording.192 Digital sampling has been
applied to sound clips from movies and television shows' 9 3 as well as visual
images.
194
It initially appears that copying the original, as well as distributing or
displaying the digital copies, constitutes an infringement. The phenome-
non of digital sampling has been pervasive in the music industry 195 and
will most certainly increase as digital technology becomes more widely
available.
While an artist is permitted to make a new sound recording based
upon the same composition upon which the first sound recording is
based, the Copyright Act expressly prohibits the reproduction, distribu-
187. See Mary B. Percifull, Digital Sampling: Creative or just Plain "CFEEZ-OLD?', 42 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1263, 1263 (1992).
188. Id.
189. See id. Musical digital sampling involves recording sounds and storing them in digi-
tal format in a computer. The samples can then be replayed and edited, allowing a musician
"to create virtually any type of recording instead of hiring individual instrumentalists to play
each part." For a complete description of the digital sampling process, see id at n.4-6. For a
discussion of the technical aspects of digital sampling of sounds, see id. at 1264-66 n. 11-29
and accompanying text. See also Note: A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Play, 105
H.stv. L. REV. 726, 726-27 (1992).
190. See Percifull, supra note 187, at 1264-66.
191. See Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
192. One example of the capabilities of digital sampling is the ability of singer Natalie
Cole to record a "duet" with her deceased father Nat "King" Cole. Jeffrey H. Brown, Com-
ment, "They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To": The Legal Implications of "Sampling" in
Contemporary Music, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1941, 1942 (1992). Another recent recording session
exemplifies also the convergence of the various multimedia technologies. A new Frank Sina-
tra album, "Duets," was released November 3, 1993. On the album, Mr. Sinatra sings duets
with a number of different singers. The duets were recorded while Mr. Sinatra was in a
studio with the band in Los Angeles and his singing partners were located around the world,
some recording their parts at later dates with others almost literally phoning in their contri-
butions via a fiber-optic system that links recording studios by telephone. Stephen Holden,
Pop's Patriarch Makes Music Along With His Heirs, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct.'31, 1993, § 2, at 1; Steve
Eddy, Frankie: Sinatra Returns With Duets,' His First New Material In a Decade, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Oct. 29, 1993, at 1.
193. See Seymour, supra note 27, at 99; Brown, supra note 192, at 1943-44.
194. Brown, supra note 192, at 1943 n.9. One of the most popular examples of digital
sampling of images is a Diet Coke commercial in which the actors Humphrey Bogart and
James Cagney and the musician Louis Armstrong join the contemporary musician EltonJohn
and other actors in a nightclub. Id.
195. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1264-66 and accompanying text. For an example of
copyright infringement based on digital sampling, see Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at
183, at 1264-66 "[T]he defendants in this action for copyright infringement would have this
court believe that stealing is rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their con-
duct here should be excused." Id.
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tion, or the making of a derivative work based upon, the actual copy-
righted work.1 96 Digital sampling, whether of sounds or images, therefore
appears to be prohibited without the authorization of the copyright
owner. 197 Before there can be infringement, however, a substantial por-
tion of the copyright holder's work must be appropriated.
198
Determining what constitutes a substantial portion is a qualitative, not
a quantitative, analysis.1 99 Although a digital sample may consist of only a
196. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1988) provides that the exclusive rights of the owner of the
copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3).
Further, § 114 (b) provides that the exclusive right to reproduce (§ 106(1)) a sound record-
ing is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords, or
of copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, that directly or indirectly recapture
the actual sounds fixed in the recording; the exclusive fight to prepare a derivative work
(§ 106(2)) based upon a sound recording is limited to a work in which the actual sounds fixed
in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality,
and the exclusive rights granted under §§ 106(1) & (2) do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording.
In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides that in the case of nondra-
matic musical works, the exclusive rights provided under §§ 106(1) & (3), to make and to
distribute phonorecords of such works, are subject to compulsory licensing as specified in
§ 115. Section 115(a)(1) provides that a person may obtain a compulsory license to make
and distribute phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work once phonorecords of the work
have been distributed to the U.S. public under the authority of the copyright holder, pro-
vided the compulsory licensee's primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute
them to the public for private use. Section 115(a) (2) further provides that the compulsory
license does not permit the licensee's arrangement of the nondramatic musical work to
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) defines "phonorecords" as material objects in which sounds,
other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
The term "phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) defines "sound recordings" as works that result from the fixation
of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
197. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1272.
It seems that digital sampling would be explicitly proscribed by the copyright
act. After all, digital samples "directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds
fixed in the recording," and the samples are not entirely "independent fixations[s]"
of new sounds. Congress, however, has not prohibited all copying. The House Re-
port accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 states that "infringement takes place
whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a
copyrighted sound recording are reproduced.., by repressing, transcribing, recap-
turing off the air, or any other method" The report indicates that the purpose of the
statute was to protect "substantial portions" of a copyrighted piece, rather than indi-
'vidual notes. Digital sampling technology was not readily available at the time this
report was released.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
5659, 5721).
198. Id.
199. Feder v. Videotrip, 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (D. Colo. 1988).
[Sluppose the similarity, although literal, is not comprehensive, that is, the funda-
mental substance, or skeleton or overall scheme of the plaintiff's work has not been
copied.... At what point does such fragmented similarity become substantial so as
to constitute the borrowing an infringement?
No easy rule of thumb can be stated as to the quantum of fragmented literal
similarity permitted without crossing the line of substantial similarity. The question
in each case is whether the similarity relates to matter which constitutes a substantial
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few seconds of another's sound recording, it can still be considered a sub-
stantial portion of the original work. "Even if the similar material is quan-
titatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may properly
find substantial similarity."
20°
This approach was followed in the recent sampling case of Jarvis v.
A&M Records.2 01 In particular, thejarvis court noted that while determin-
ing substantial similarity, non-copyrightable elements must be removed
from the analysis. 202 The court recognized, however, that although the
copying involved cliched phrases typical in the musical field, their use to-
gether in a particular arrangement and in the context of a particular mel-
ody could constitute copyrightable expression.20 3 The court held that
"the precise relationship of the phrases vis a vis each other was copied"
20 4
and denied the "defendant's motion for summary judgment as to liability
on plaintiff's musical composition copyright claim."20 5
Although different types of works were involved (sound recordings
versus computer programs), the Jarvis court used an analysis very similar to
that used in Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.20 6 Because the
Jarvis court was dealing with fragmented literal copying, as opposed to
non-literal copying, there was no need to apply an abstractions test.20 7 As
in Computer Associates, however, theJarvis court made sure to filter out non-
protectable elements before making a comparison between the works to
determine whether they were substantially similar.20 8 Courts must be
careful not to carry this analysis too far in their attempt to ascertain a
protectable core of material, otherwise they may find themselves limiting
Congress' intended scope of copyright protection.2° 9
To avoid restricting the scope of copyright protection, courts, as well
as multimedia users, should keep in mind the balancing of interests re-
quired by the Constitution.210 "Digital technology requires a balancing of
the interests of artists in retaining artistic and economic control over their
works against the interest of artists in having access to raw material for use
in creative works."
211
portion of plaintiffs work - not whether such material constitutes a substantial
portion of defendant's work.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 1176; see also Percifull, supra note 187, 1274-75.
201. 827 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J. 1993).
202. Id. at 291. "Since it is not unlawful to copy non-copyrightable portions of a plaintiff's
work, non-copyrightable elements must be factored out in an inquiry into infringement." Id.
203. Id. at 292. "There is no question that the combined phrase 'ooh ooh ooh ooh ooh
move . .. Free your body' is an expression of an idea that was copyrightable." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra text accompany notes 123-26.
207. Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 290 (abstraction test used to separate idea from underlying
expression where copied material consisted of general statement of what original material
was about).
208. Id. at 291.
209. See supra notes 113-18, 133 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
211. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1269.
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Despite the fact that a substantial portion of a copyrighted work may
have been copied, infringement may be excused under the Copyright
Act's "fair use" doctrine. 2 12 Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbel42 13 concerned the
2 Live Crew's version of the Roy Orbison/William Dees song "Oh, Pretty
Woman."2 14 Although the plaintiff's expert witness testified that portions
of the original recording may have been sampled and incorporated into
the 2 Live Crew's version, 215 the case did not involve literal copying of any
portion of the original sound recording.2 16 Initially, 2 Live Crew (defend-
ants) had sought to make payments to the plaintiff under the Copyright
Act's compulsory license provisions.2 17 They later raised the affirmative
defense that their song was a parody of the original and therefore not an
infringement.
2 1 8
Parody and satire are considered an extension of "comment" and
"criticism" allowed under § 107 of the Copyright Act.2 1 9 The Acuff-Rose
Music court was quick to point out that all parodies are not fair uses.
220
Instead, courts analyze each of the four factors expressed in § 107.221
The purpose and character of the use of the original song is the first
factor analyzed.22 2 The Acuff-Rose court initially noted that the purpose of
the use was parody and that the character of the use was commercial.
223
The second factor to consider is the nature of the copyrighted work.
2 2 4
"As a general rule, creative works-literary works of fiction or artistic
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), provides, in part:
[T] he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching.... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
213. 972 F.2d 1429, 1451 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (addressing the
issue of whether the alleged infringers' commercial parody was a 'fair use' within the mean-
ing of 17 U.S.C. § 107).
214. Id. at 1432.
215. Id. at 1433.
216. Id. at 1432.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1432.
218. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1432.
219. Id. at 1432. "Indeed, the fair use formulation found in section 107 is a reflection of
Congress's intent to codify the common law fair use doctrine, which has long included par-
ody." Id. at 1435 (citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 549,
(1985)).
220. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1435.
221. See supra note 212.
222. Id.
223. 972 F.2d at 1435-36. It should be noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit concluded
with great reluctance that the defendants' song was a parody of the original, as found by the
district court. Id. at 1435. The Court of Appeals in its parody analysis noted that the second
work must at least make a comment on, and not just copy, the original work in order to
constitute a parody. Id. at 1436.
224. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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works-are afforded greater protection from the fair use determination
than are works of fact."2 25 The third factor to consider is the amount and
substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used in the second
work.2 26 At first glance, this analysis seems redundant to the requirement
that a substantial portion of the copyrighted work be copied before there
can be infringement.22 7 The final factor, and "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use,"2 28 is the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
2 29
Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement
would leave the copyright holder with no defense against predict-
able damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that fu-
ture harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood
of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain,
that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommer-
cial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.
230
The "inquiry under the fourth statutory factor not only considers harm to
the market for the original but harm to the market for derivative works as
well."
231
As noted previously, courts have applied the fair use doctrine to the
making of intermediate copies of computer programs.23 2 In Sega Enter-
prises v. Accolade,213 the parties developed, manufactured and marketed
competing video games.2 34 The defendant, Accolade, produced video
game cartridges that could be played in consoles manufactured by other
video game manufacturers, including those manufactured by Sega.23 5
Sega incorporated a security system into its video game console so that
only game cartridges Sega manufactured or licensed could be used with
the console.23 6 Accolade then "reverse engineered" Sega's video game
programs in order to bypass Sega's security system.
23 7
Like the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose Music, the Ninth Circuit in Sega
Enterprises analyzed the four principal considerations under § 107 of the
Copyright Act. As to the first factor, the Sega Enterprises court ruled that
225. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1437 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563).
226. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
227. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
228. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
230. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1438.
231. Id. at 1439. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), defines a "derivative work" as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound record-
ing, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
232. E.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 163-74
and accompanying text.
233. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
234. Id. at 1514.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1515.
237. Id. at 1514-15.
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the presumption of unfairness arising from the copying for a commercial
purpose was rebutted for the following reasons: the copying was interme-
diate, and done solely to discover the functional requirements of compati-
bility with Sega's game console-aspects of Sega's programs not protected
by copyright.2 8 Therefore, any commercial exploitation resulting from
the copying was indirect.
23 9
The nature of the copyrighted work is the second factor to consider,
and was fundamental to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega Enterprise. As
noted previously, fictional works receive much greater protection than
fact-based or functional works.2 40 The Sega Enterprise court, noting the dif-
ficulties courts have had defining the copyrightable nature of computer
programs, 24 1 did not determine whether they should be classified as pri-
marily fictional or fact-based works.24 2 Instead, the court focused its atten-
tion on the one element that makes computer programs unique:
computer programs are generally distributed in object code form.243 As a
result, the unprotected ideas they may contain are not readily ascertain-
able.2 44 On this basis, the court concluded that disassembly of the object
code, which included intermediate copying, was permissible.24 5 Other-
wise the copyright holder would be effectively granted protection for the
underlying ideas which could only be discerned through the disassembly
process.
2 46
The court next evaluated the amount and substantiality of the portion
of the copyrighted work used in the second work.247 Although the de-
fendant copied the plaintiffs entire work, the court indicated this third
factor had very little weight in light of its consideration of the second fac-
tor.248 Finally, even though the defendant was making copies of the plain-
tiff's work in order to directly compete with the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit
actually believed this factor weighed in favor of the defendant. 249 Con-
trary to the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbel
250
the Ninth Circuit in Sega Enterprise obviously did not believe that the de-
fendant's "blatantly commercial purpose" for copying prevented a finding
of fair use.
25 1
The varying emphases on different factors by the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits illustrate the differing views courts take as to whether a particular use
is a fair use.25 2 As works traditionally considered fictional in nature be-
238. Id. at 1522. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
239. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522.
240. See supra notes 115-18; Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1524.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 1525.
244. I
245. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1526-27.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1525-26.
250. 972 F.2d 1429, 1451 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. CL 1164 (1994).
251. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 212-51 and accompanying text.
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come more integrated into computer technology, it is unknown which of
the four factors courts will determine dispositive of the issue of fair use.
For example, computer users seem to enjoy playing sound "bytes"
from movies on their computers.2 53 The author has personally witnessed
a number of personal computers configured so that the famous line spo-
ken by Arnold Schwarzenegger in the movie The Terminator-"I'll be
back"-is heard when the computer is shut down. While this portion of
the motion picture is quantitatively small, it is qualitatively significant. For
most of the public, the phrase is synonymous with Mr. Schwarzenegger
and the movie.
Its unlicensed use appears to constitute an unfair use. Although it is a
qualitatively substantial portion from a fictional work, most people use it
for their own personal amusement, and not for commercial gain. Such
use will unlikely have an effect on the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work. Such use is not for purposes of criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research as required by the
Copyright Act of 1976.254 As noted previously, however, commentators
have argued that the fair use doctrine should be adaptable.
255
Could someone instead permissibly imitate Mr. Schwarzenegger's
voice and make a recording of the exact phrase? In general, the substan-
tial similarity analysis under the Copyright Act must be made for fictional
characters.2 5 6 However, "[a] character in a work in which the character is
central to the story is copyrightable."2 57 For example, in Universal City Stu-
dios v. Kamar Industries,258 the defendant marketed merchandise copied
from E. T., Universal's copyrighted motion picture, 259 with inscriptions
such as "I love You E.T." and "E.T. Phone Home!" 26° The court held that
"[t] he inscriptions on the defendant's products would be readily recogniza-
ble to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue from the copyrighted movie
and, therefore, the test for copyright infringement has been satisfied."
26 1
Multimedia applications are much more manipulative and powerful
than the mere fragmented literal copying that digital sampling provides.
Works, or portions of works, including sound recordings, 262 motion pic-
253. See Seymour, supra note 27 at 99.
254. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). But see Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552, 554 (1985) (list of examples in § 107 is not intended to be
exhaustive).
255. See supra note 175.
256. See generally Note, Michael T. Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman:
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44
STAN. L. REv. 623 (1992) (explaining the nature of fictional characters and how their unau-
thorized use can result in a judgement of infringement); David B. Feldman, Finding a Home
for Fictional Characters: A Proposalfor Change in Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. Rav. 687 (1990)
(considering the varying ways in which courts apply copyright protection for fictional
characters).
257. Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162 (D.S.D. Tex. 1982)
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1166.
261. Id.
262. See supra note 196 for the Copyright Act definition of sound recording.
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tures,263 and audiovisual works,2 64 may also be altered. Consider, for ex-
ample, Humphrey Bogart appearing in a scene in which he was never
physically present and performing an act which he never would have done
while he was alive (e.g., ordering a Diet Coke).2 65 Creating such altera-
tions constitutes preparing a derivative work260-an exclusive right of the
copyright holder26 7 -subject only to a fair use defense.268 The ability to
alter a broad range of expression creates myriad problems.
For the most part, however, once certain types of works (including
sound recordings, motion pictures, and audiovisual works) are no longer
protected by copyright (through lapse or expiration of the copyright), or
ownership of the copyright has been transferred (without express lan-
guage to the contrary in the transfer of copyright ownership), they may be
freely altered.2 69 For example, a multimedia-type application in use for
some time now is a process known as "colorization."270 Colorization is a
process by which motion pictures originally recorded in black and white
are altered so that they appear to have been recorded in color.
2 71
The opposition to colorization was swift and extreme, with exclama-
tions of moral outrage and "cultural butchery."272 While supporters of
colorization claim they are merely providing older and classic films in a
form desired by the public,27" its opponents raise two basic arguments
against colorization: colorization will inhibit the availability of classic mo-
tion pictures in their original black and white form, and colorization is
inconsistent with the artist's original creative intent.274 Alteration of an
existing work, however, particularly a type of work which may be incorpo-
rated into a multimedia application, (therefore a derivative work), is es-
sentially limited only by the exclusive rights granted under § 106 of the
Copyright Act 2 75 and the fair use doctrine.
276
263. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), defines "motion pictures" as "audiovisual works consisting of
a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any."
264. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), defines "audiovisual works" as:
[W]orks that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to
be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
265. See supra note 194.
266. See supra note 231 for the Copyright Act definition of derivative work.
267. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
268. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also supra notes 212-51 and accompany-
ing text.
269. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-120 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
270. See Comment, Anna S. White, The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory As a Means
ofJudicial and Legislative Reform, 38 EMOfv L J. 237, 237 (1989). Colorization is a registered
trademark of Colorization, Inc. Id. at n.1
271. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the colorization process, see id. at 237 n.2.
272. Id. at 240-41.
273. Id at 239.
274. Brown, supra note 192, at 240-43.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). In response to the colorization controversies, Congress
passed the National Film Preservation Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1782
(1988) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 178 (1988)). It essentially allows a limited number of motion
pictures to be protected and requires a notice on colorized films that such films have been
materially altered. See White, supra note 270, at 238.
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Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America2 7 7 involved the alteration of a
copyrighted work and the alleged creation of a derivative of that work.
Galoob manufactured a device which allowed players to alter features of
Nintendo games. 278 Nintendo alleged that Galoob's device created a de-
rivative work in violation of Nintendo's exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2).279
The Ninth Circuit held that Galoob's device did not create an in-
dependent work; it merely enhanced the audiovisual displays that origi-
nate in Nintendo game cartridges.280 "The altered displays do not
incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or perma-
nent form."
2 8 1
The court also considered whether the Galoob device constituted a
fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act even if the device was found to
be a derivative work.2 8 2 Judicial decisions have broadened the fair use
doctrine: "The doctrine of fair use allows a holder of the privilege to use
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the
copyright owner."28 3 The court then analyzed the four factors expressed
in § 107.284 In particular, Nintendo argued that Galoob's device was sup-
planting Nintendo's commercially valuable right to make and sell deriva-
tive works. 285 Noting that the fourth factor is the "most important and
indeed central fair use factor,"28 6 the court upheld the district court's
finding that Nintendo had "failed to show any harm to the present market
for its copyrighted games and [had] failed to establish the reasonable likeli-
Congress also passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128 (Dec. 1, 1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506,
608-610 (1990)). These amendments essentially prevent the use of an author's name as the
author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create, and prevent the use of an
author's name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputa-
tion. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a) (1) (B) & (a) (2) (Supp. IV. 1992). A "work of visual art" is defined
in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as encompassing certain paintings, drawings, prints and photographs. As
expressly provided by the Visual Artists Rights Act, a work of visual art does not include any
motion picture or audiovisual work, data base, electronic information service, electronic pub-
lication, or similar publication. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1992). For the most part, there-
fore, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 is inapplicable to most multimedia applications.
For more information regarding the Visual Artists Rights Act, see Brett Sirota, The Visual
Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights, 21 HoFsrTA L. Ray. 461 (1992); Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L Rav. 945 (1990).
276. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1992); see also supra notes 212-51 and accompany-
ing text.
277. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
278. Id. at 967.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 968.
281. Id. at 969.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 970.
285. Id. at 970.
286. Id. at 971.
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Cases such as Lewis Galoob Toys and Sega Enterpyises illustrate how
courts must apply traditional copyright principles in ways not previously
envisioned. While the rush of multimedia products is under way, all of
their various forms and interactions with existing technologies are yet to
be conceived or anticipated. Existing copyright laws, however, are ex-
pected to provide protection.
Computer software is a form of work for which courts have had diffi-
culty categorizing the extent of available copyright protection. In particu-
lar, recent judicial holdings have severely limited the scope of
protection. 2 88 Certain courts have even questioned whether copyright is
the appropriate form of protection.28 9 In addition, the risk of inconsis-
tent results arise as courts attempt to formulate approaches for determin-
ing the level of protection to be afforded computer programs. Software
developers face the prospect of seeing their original expressions commer-
cially exploited by competitors.
Into this uncertain judicial environment comes a tidal wave of mul-
timedia applications. While, for the most part, they consist of "traditional"
works-sound recordings, motion pictures, dramatic works-multimedia
applications are fundamentally computer programs. Exclusive rights avail-
able to authors to copy, distribute, and display multimedia works, as well as
restrictions on those exclusive rights, are subject to doubt based upon the
existing software copyright decisions.
290
The fundamental elements of copyright-exclusive rights, idea versus
expression, and fair use-are sound. It is the application of these ele-
ments to emerging technologies that leave courts struggling to extrapolate
existing approaches to new concepts.A1 History demonstrates that copy-
right laws have had difficulty keeping pace with technological develop-
ments. The experience of software copyright protection has been one of
courts struggling to apply traditional precedents to unfamiliar technolo-
gies. The rapid development of multimedia only promises new
challenges.
287. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 971.
288. See supra notes 135-65, 171-82 and accompanying text.
289. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In-
deed, it has been suggested that computer software is better protected by patent law than by
copyright law."); Randall M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Pleafor Due Processes: Defining the Proper
Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L RLV. 1103, 1123-25 (1991).
290. See supra Part IIA.
291. See supra Part II.B.
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